"The first clause, though describing Galatea's levity, is not relevant to the immediate situation; her present behaviour is described in the second and what follows." This "irrelevancy" he explains by suggesting that Theocritus felt constrained to put in both halves of what was probably a proverbial expression. Cholmeley too wanted the line to be "taken universally." Gow feels it necessary in this context to explain Theocritus' use of φιλεῖν rather than ἐρᾶν.

Gow's suggestion that 17 is proverbial seems weak. The idea appears as a commonplace only after Theocritus' use of it (e.g., 5. 247; Nonnus 16. 297; Terence *Eun.* 812 ff.). Sappho (1. 21 ff.) uses a similar idea but not in a way that suggests it was at all trite or proverbial. Even if it were proverbial by the Hellenistic age, Theocritus is quite capable of using it without its "irrelevant" first half (e.g., 11. 75). If διαθρύπτεται means that Galatea puts on only a single air, a provocative one, then in the strictest sense only οὐ φιλέοντα διώκει applies, but only the most literal and prosaic reading could dismiss the rest as irrelevant. Clearly, διαθρύπτεται could equally well imply that she puts on both airs, the provocative *and* the coy, and in that case φεύγει φιλέοντα is also appropriate, as Gow finally, if grudgingly, seems to admit ("Alternately 17 might be regarded as an expansion of διαθρύπτεται"), following Cholmeley ("The sentence should probably be taken universally, connecting it with διαθρύπτεται"). What both seem to have failed to see is that the simile bears out the double action aptly and completely, for the floating seed naturally moves toward you, attaching itself to your hair or woolen garments; but, if you attempt to snatch it in your hand as it approaches, the draught created by your movement wafts it away again. Although Galatea herself is the subject in 17, the action described in both halves fits the thistledown exactly. φιλεῖν seems appropriate to the behavior of both girl and thistledown, whereas ἐρᾶν might be said to fit only the former. Galatea may be in pursuit at this point, but Theocritus intends us at least to infer that Polyphemus' indifference is only temporary or feigned. The comparison shows precisely what her reaction will be to a change in him.

When Homer compares Odysseus' wrecked raft to thistledown tossed in the wind, he is, as Cholmeley noted, concerned primarily with the restless and aimless movement of both, but he refers also to the thistledown's adhesive quality. The seeds cling together (πυκιναὶ δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλῃσιν ἔχονται, *Od.* 5. 329), and the poet perhaps intends us to see in this Odysseus clutching the raft (οὐδ' ὡς σχεδίης ἐπελήθετο . . . ἐλλάβετ' αὐτῆς, 324–25). It is the adhesive rather than the restless quality with which Theocritus is concerned. He is not throwing down inept proverbial phrases; he has borrowed a simple simile from Homer and given it new vitality and complexity, making it even more appropriate to his context than it was to Homer's. In no sense could it be described as "loosely attached to its context" and no part of it is inappropriate or irrelevant to the situation.

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ON PROPERTIUS 3. 24: A REPLY

Propertius 3. 24, a poem well known for difficulties which stem in the main from uncertainty in the text and punctuation of lines 9–12, has lately been re-evaluated by Alva Walter Bennett.[1] An able Latinist, Bennett has contributed to our understanding of Propertius; but with reference to 3. 24, not only his conclusions but also his methodology seem to me unsatisfactory.

Bennett writes: "Cynthia's *superbia* had taken in action the form of *perfidia* toward her lover/poet; and the invective of the elegy is his poetical response to her infidelity. It is Jupiter, Zeus Horkios, who demands punishment for

1. A. W. Bennett, "Propertius 3. 24: A New Approach," *CP*, LXIV (1969), 30–35.

perfidia; he presides over the pronouncement of oaths, and his thunderbolt is a reminder that their terms must be fulfilled—except in the case of lovers. In this parting mention of Jupiter's failure to help, Propertius offers further acknowledgment of his poor judgment during the days when he was in love; and at the same time a token of his return finally to good sense: he knows now what everyone must know."[2]

A word has its denotation, that to which it specifically refers, and its connotation, the associative meanings it implies, e.g., "home" denotes the place in which one lives, but connotes privacy, coziness, etc. That the denotation of *superbus*, *-a*, *-um*, and *superbia* is not respectively *perfidus*, *-a*, *-um* and *perfidia* may be safely guaranteed on the basis of the lexica of the Latin language where no example is found of *superbus* = *perfidus* and *superbia* = *perfidia*. That the denotation of *superbus* and *superbia* cannot be *perfidus* and *perfidia* must with reasonable certainty be accepted on the basis of the general truth that "arrogance" (in any degree) is not a typical characteristic (or even characteristic at all) of the perfidious; nor is "perfidy," of the arrogant. It is a *non sequitur* to say: X is arrogant; consequently X must (or may) be perfidious.

But, we may be told, the *superba* in question is not X but Cynthia. I agree, making the further point that Bennett in reality does not derive perfidy from "arrogance" but from Cynthia. Had Propertius spoken not of Cynthia's *superbia* but of *any* of her other characteristics, which did not exclude perfidy, Bennett could have again restored *perfidia*.

In 3. 24, Cynthia as *perfida* cannot derive from what the poet says about Cynthia in his own words. The text (I use throughout my paper H. E. Butler's LCL translation) reads: "False, woman, is the trust thou puttest in thy beauty; long since the partial judgment of mine eyes hath made thee overproud. Such praise of old my love bestowed on thee, and now it shames me that thou hast glory from my song. Oft did I praise the varied beauty of thy blending charms, and love deemed thee to be that which thou wert not. Oft was thy hue compared to the rosy star of dawn, though the splendour of thy face owed naught to nature . . ."

The poet explicitly tells Cynthia that she is not "beautiful" and "charming" as once he thought she was, and that the confidence she has in her beauty is false. The "overproud" Cynthia, on the basis of the context, is clearly overproud *in her beauty*. Similarly, in 3. 8*a* Cynthia is introduced as *superba* on the basis of her beauty: "Rejoice that none is fair as thou! Thou wouldst grieve if there were any. But now [*sc.* that none is fair as thou] thou hast just cause for pride ('nunc sis iure superba licet')." By the way, it would have been ridiculous to take "nunc sis iure superba licet" to connote "now thou hast just cause to be perfidious."

The inevitable conclusion is that on the basis of the Latin text of 3. 24 there is no evidence to justify the assertion that Cynthia (in 3. 24) is meant to be *perfida*. Thus *perfida* must come from the Cynthia of other poems. But if we should understand the Cynthia of 3. 24 in the light of other poems, why should we understand her as only perfidious and not also as of cruel tongue, tyrannically possessive, temperamental, unjust, dishonest,[3] etc.? In other words, why in interpreting 3. 24 should we narrow this many-sided Cynthia to Cynthia the *perfida*? Can Bennett argue that in 3. 24 the poet meant Cynthia to be narrowly understood, as *perfida*, and not broadly understood with all the characteristics of the seamy side of her character as depicted elsewhere in Propertius' poetry?

But let us assume that Bennett could establish that in 3. 24 *perfidia* is the only (or the predominant) characteristic which we should associate with Cynthia. The next difficulty for Bennett would be to justify the significance of this *perfidia* in the aesthetic field of the poem. When we see a picture presenting a vase with flowers, we may assume that the vase contains water, but the element water has no significance in the aesthetic appreciation of the picture. It would certainly be strange to center the appre-

2. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

3. Cf. 1. 3, 1. 5, 1. 18, 3. 25, to offer only few examples.

ciation of the picture around the concept that in the vase there is (or may be) water. How can Bennett argue that Cynthia's *perfidia* for 3. 24 has any greater significance than the water has for the picture? Surely Bennett does not simply restrict *perfidia* to the logical periphery of 3. 24, but makes it the key for the poem's interpretation: (1) Cynthia is *perfida*; (2) Jove is Horkios (presiding over *fides* and *perfidia*); (3) Propertius attacks Cynthia for her *perfidia*. These three points are advanced explicitly by Bennett himself,[4] to which we may add by inference: (4) Propertius was *fidus* (if he were *perfidus* how could he invoke Jove Horkios?); and (5) the suffering of Propertius (vss. 12–14) was caused by Cynthia's *perfidia*. Thus the poem in part and in whole pivots around *perfidia*, although, as we said, there is no evidence in the Latin text of the poem to guide the reader toward *perfidia*, let alone to make him understand that *perfidia* forms the core of the poem's interpretation.

I may add here that the similarities which Bennett finds between 3. 24 and Ovid *Amores* 3. 12 are in the main imagined.[5] "Each poet responds to mistreatment from the *puella* originating in *superbia* generated by his own former elegiac praise."[6] These are Bennett's words. Yet, just as I find no evidence in the text of 3. 24 to establish *perfidia*, so I find none in *Amores* 3. 12 to establish the girl's *superbia*. In the Ovidian poem the *persona* makes it clear that his sharing of the girl with others (whether it has already happened or is about to happen or is only fear on the part of the lover/poet) is the result of his own folly and the folly of those others. This hardly leaves room to argue that Ovid wishes his reader to suppose that the girl's *perfidia* derives from *superbia* on her part, the less so since there is no evidence of the girl's *superbia* in the text. Furthermore, the "mistreatment" of the Ovidian lover/poet by the girl derives from Bennett and not from what the *persona* says. Since the lover/poet blames himself and his readers for what has happened, the girl appears hardly as acting (so as to "mistreat" anyone), but only, or predominantly, as acted upon (regardless of whether or not she enjoys the situation she finds herself in). What "mistreats" the lover/poet, in his own estimate, is himself and his readers. As to the "invective" of *Amores* 3. 12 (if "invective" is the appropriate word for it), it is most certainly not directed against the girl. The lover/poet in this poem does not deny the girl's beauty. How could he? The very fact that he will have to share the girl with others is proof that the girl is in great demand. Furthermore, the lover/poet himself says: "quid enim formae praeconia feci?"—"Why was I the crier of her beauty?" (not "of her beauty, which in reality does not exist" but "of her beauty"). The gist of thought in *Amores* 3. 12 is: "I am afraid I shall have to share my girl with others. I am to be blamed for that. It was in the first place a mistake on my part to advertise her beauty in my poetry. In doing so, I acted more or less like a procurer. But even more, the blame rests upon my readers who trusted what I said in those poems. Poetry throughout is full of fantasies and lies. Those damned readers of mine ought to have been sophisticated enough to know this truth and not take the poetic praises of my girl's beauty at face value [regardless of the fact that my girl happens to be beautiful in reality as well]. Oh yes! Those readers of mine in their unsophisticated credulity are even more responsible than I for what has happened." The "invective" is clearly directed against the lover/poet and his readers and by no means against the girl.

So far as I can see, Bennett's argument in support of *perfidia* in Propertius 3. 24 via Ovid's *Amores* 3. 12 amounts to a *petitio principii*. 3. 24 is to be interpreted by Bennett on the basis of "conventions" and "motifs" found in *Amores* 3. 12. But since *Amores* 3. 12 is also interpreted previously by 3. 24 (and so, for example, *superbia* is transplanted by Bennett into the Ovidian poem from Propertius' poem), in reality 3. 24 is interpreted by

4. See Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

5. Ov. *Am.* 3. 12 is utilized by Bennett to uncover the elegiac "conventions" which determine the thought of Propertius 3. 24 (esp. vss. 1–12).

6. Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

Bennett on the basis of "conventions" and "motifs" of 3. 24 as understood by Bennett. Therefore, A (=3. 24) is B (=the interpretation that Bennett imposes on 3. 24) because A is B.

Let us now consider Bennett's Jove Horkios. Objections against Bennett's assumption that Jove (vs. 20) is Horkios will arise if we observe the sequence of thought in the context in which Jove appears. The translation of 15–20 runs: "But lo! my ships have found haven and wear wreaths of thanksgiving, the Syrtes are crossed and mine anchor cast. Now at last my senses return to me, aweary of the wild sea-tides; my wounds have closed, my flesh is healed. Good Sense, if any such goddess there be, I dedicate myself to the service of thy shrine, for Jove was deaf and took no heed of all my vows." The ships which have found haven and wear wreaths of thanksgiving after their crossing of the Syrtes (the notoriously dangerous sand-banks) bespeak safety after danger; and the following "now my senses return to me," etc. makes the metaphor of ships–Syrtes–haven crystal clear. Propertius is safe from his previous hallucinations about Cynthia.

Also the "wreaths of thanksgiving" correspond to the thanksgiving offered to Good Sense by the saved Propertius. Propertius, while thanking Good Sense for his salvation, mentions that Jove was deaf to his prayers. Prayers for what? The context clearly suggests by analogy prayers for help, for salvation, not prayers for punishment of the perfidious.

Jove should be understood (if he need be understood in any other way than simply as Jove) as *Zeus Sōtēr* or *Zeus Eleutherios* or *Iuppiter Salvator* or the like. The salvation of the lover/poet from the grip of his former hallucinations came not from Jove, the mightiest of gods, but from Good Sense. This simply projects the importance of Good Sense by way of contrast. Why Zeus took no heed of the lover/poet's vows is immaterial (he either could not help or did not wish to help—who knows the ways of gods?); what matters is that he, the traditionally greatest of all gods, proved to be of no help, while Good Sense proved decisively helpful. And since *Mens Bona* points eloquently to the lover/poet's good sense, the lover/poet, while paying tribute to *Mens Bona*, congratulates himself for his own achievement.[7]

I am not in sympathy with the results of Bennett's attempt to interpret 11–12. He takes *quod* (9) to refer "to Propertius' behavior as one who attributed praiseworthy qualities to a Cynthia who did not in reality possess them" and *haec* (11) to refer "to the individual claims for beauty which Propertius had formerly made."[8] Putting a full stop after *mari* (10), reading *at* (11), *vera* (12), and *fatebar* (12) Bennett paraphrases: "From this behavior neither the friends of my family could turn me away, nor Thessalian witch purge from me with all the waters of the sea. I gave *warrant* [italics mine] for the truth of these claims not under constraint of fire or steel [which would be expected to extort the truth], but as a shipwreck on the very Aegean sea [one crazed with love]."[9] I wish that Bennett, instead of paraphrasing, had first given in Latin what he considers to be the antecedent of *haec* (and of *quod* in 9) on the basis of what we read in 1–10 and, then, that he had closely translated the Latin text. Had he done so, he would have realized how unlikely it is that Propertius would have employed such cryptic Latin to express the thought which Bennett proposes. Surely Propertius did not mean to baffle his readers with the most obscure riddles. But let us consider here only the thought of Bennett's paraphrase. Why is it appropriate that the lover/poet should say "I gave *warrant* for the truth of these claims . . ."? What is the significance, aesthetic, logical, or rhetorical, of the mention of such warrant? Is

7. There is no real contradiction if the *persona* first attributes his salvation to himself and then offers thanks to *Mens Bona* for the same salvation: (a) we may assume that the *persona* and *Mens Bona* mean more or less "*my* Good Sense" as one unit; or (b) we may assume that the *persona* means to say, "I saved myself with the help of (the goddess) Good Sense," in the usual manner of accomplishing something σὺν θεῷ or *cum deo*, etc. Concerning the invocation of Jove, cf. Propertius 2. 28 where Jove is invoked as the god who in his might can save the sick *puella* from death (esp. vs. 44, "per magnum est salva puella Iovem").

8. Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

the reader expected to doubt the "individual claims for beauty" which in the past Propertius had made about Cynthia? Or is such "warrant" intrinsically needed for the poem's development? Consider the following point: what matters most for the thesis of 3. 24 is not what the lover/poet made of Cynthia in the past days of his *Mens Mala*, but what he makes of her now, in the state of his *Mens Bona*. Therefore, if a "warrant" is to be introduced into this poem, it must establish not the claims of the lover/poet for a "beautiful" Cynthia in the past, but his claims in the present that such a "beautiful" Cynthia has never existed—all the more so, since the lover/poet's past suffering is at least indirect evidence arguing for a "beautiful" Cynthia and not for an "ugly" one. I must conclude that the "warrant" interpretation is in all probability wrong. With many other scholars, I consider it more likely that the *ego* in 11 emphasizes the lover/poet as opposed to such persons as the "father's friends" (9) and the "witch of Thessaly" (10) in a sequence of thought unknown to us in its details (11–12 are in more than one point doubtful), but in general saying something like "neither friends nor magic availed in my case . . .; my salvation came from myself."[10]

Whence has *Mens Bona* arisen? We are not told explicitly (at least on the basis of the extant text). But the erotic suffering so emphatically described in 13–14 (and 12), "Venus caught me and seethed me in the caldron of her cruelty; my hands were twisted and bound behind my back," makes it possible to assume that the *Mens Bona* derives from this suffering, the derivation understood as the proverbial *πάθει μάθος*—"wisdom [and consequently *Mens Bona*] comes with suffering/experience."

Birt-Burck-Bennett may well be right (see Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 33, note 10) in taking *ferro . . . igne* to refer to a torturer extracting the truth. Yet the interpretation which refers *ferro . . . igne* to the physician cannot be shown to be impossible. We should not overlook 18, "My wounds have closed, my flesh is healed," which may possibly continue the image of *ferro . . . igne*. And, of course, there is always 1. 1. 27, where the mention of *ferrum* and *ignes* in connection with the previous verse ("quaerite non sani pectoris auxilia") may well refer to the cautery and the knife of the physician. At any rate it makes little, if any, difference whether the *ferro . . . igne* in 3. 24 refers to the physician or to the torturer (and it is perhaps for this reason that the poet did not feel that he had to be more explicit). Either of them could have attempted to force the lover/poet (cf. 11 *coactus*) to denounce Cynthia's beauty (the physician by restoring the [mental] health of the lover, the torturer either by torturing him or by intimidating him with threats of torture).

Bennett comments: ". . . the lover/poet faced with *perfidia* may *profitably* [italics mine] abandon the elegiac *laudatio* and turn it to its opposite [invective]: 'Even if she said "No" just yesterday, despise her, and she will come today.'"[11] Judging from the context in which

10. So, for example, the OCT Propertius translated in the Butler and Barber edition (p. 320): "This madness *I myself have banished* [italics mine] under no compulsion of steel or cautery, though I was shipwrecked (I will confess the truth) even on an Aegean sea of passion." A heavy emphasis on *ego* is assumed on account of the omission of a finite verb such as *averti* understood *ἐξ ἀναλόγου* from *avertere* (9), with *hoc* (a conjecture) referring back to *quod*—both *hoc* and *quod* pointing to the lover/poet's sickness. In more or less the same spirit the text has been understood by G. F. Hertzberg, J. P. Postgate, M. Rothstein, B. O. Foster, and others (for references see Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31, nn. 1–2). It is obvious, however, that with the textual uncertainties in 11–12, no selection among *lectiones* and/or conjectures can seriously claim to offer anything more than, at best, an *exempli gratia* version of what Propertius might have written. No reasonable man will attempt to interpret 3. 24 on the basis of a conjectural text. The following points, however, seem certain. Whatever the exact details, the *naufragus* metaphor (11) is the opposite of the ship(s)-in-harbor metaphor (15 ff.); and, since the latter metaphor involves the state of *Mens Bona* now, the former metaphor must refer to the past time, back to days of *Mens Mala* and subsequent hallucinations. 13–14 (whether they form two metaphors or one) refer also to the old days when the lover/poet was under the grip of Cynthia. The metaphor(s) of 13–14 is a *variatio* of the motif of the suffering lover and may, in addition, function as explaining the preceding obscure metaphor of the shipwreck in the Aegean Sea. The accumulation of the metaphors of 12–14 stresses in polaroid fashion the words *fessi resipiscimus* (17) and in general the concept of safety and relief expressed in the ship(s)-in-harbor metaphor (15 ff.). I would like to add that a remarkable parallel of the ship-in-harbor metaphor is found in Ov. *Am.* 3. 11*a*. 29–32: "Already the stern is decked with votive wreath and listens undisturbed to the swelling waters of the sea. Cease wasting your caresses and your words which once had power—I am no more the fool I used to be."

11. Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

these words appear, it seems probable that Bennett speaks with reference to 3. 24. If this is the case, then, according to Bennett, the invective in 3. 24 is "staged"—the lover/poet expects through such invective to lead this girl (deceitfully) back to himself, the girl being already lost or in danger of being lost to another lover (or lovers) through her *superbia–perfidia*. Nothing can be more arbitrary than to make the invective a mere "gimmick." True, Propertius in 2. 14. 9 reads "despise her and she will come," but most certainly we only rewrite 3. 24 (and, so far as I can judge, we rewrite it in the spirit of a pseudo-Ovid), if we see in the lover/poet the embodiment of the *sententia* of 2. 14. 9. Of this *sententia* (as of *perfidia* and Jove Horkios) there is nothing, absolutely nothing, in the text of 3. 24.

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TYRTAEUS AND HORACE *ODES* 3. 2

Simonides 12 D., ὁ δ'αὖ θάνατος ἔκιχε καὶ τὸν φυγόμαχον, and 38 D., ἔστι καὶ σιγᾶς ἀκίνδυνον γέρας,[1] have long been recognized by Horatian scholars as providing the two common expressions which are rendered at *Odes* 3. 2 as "mors et fugacem persequitur virum" (v. 14) and "est et fideli tuta silentio / merces" (vss. 25–26). It has long been recognized also that these two common sayings are the main themes of this bipartite Ode. Verse 13 of the same Ode runs, "dulce et decorum est pro patria mori." This sentiment has seemed such a commonplace that few commentators have taken the trouble to mention its possible source.[2] The idea certainly finds expression as far back as Homer (*Il.* 15. 496), and traces of it are found in Alcaeus (61 D.) and Callinus (1. 6–7 D.). The same idea, as Gow mentions in his Horace commentary, appears again in Tyrtaeus (6. 1–2 D.). It is impossible to conclude, from this fact alone, that Horace is in any way indebted to Tyrtaeus for the peculiar turn he gives to such a commonplace idea. One can only show that there is a high probability of this dependence by examining in detail the remains of Tyrtaeus and comparing them with the Horatian Ode in question. If one finds similarities of word and idea in what might be called the background or non-critical areas of the Horatian poem, if one can identify common phrases or turns of expression or similar emphases on specific priorities, then one can submit that such similarities cannot be put down to mere coincidence but that there is a clear case of dependence. I think that this is true.

It is now generally accepted that the first six Odes of Book 3 form a cycle, the only one in Horace's *Odes*.[3] The order of composition and the order of importance need not concern us here; what is important is that they deal with some of the virtues which Horace and Augustus and all sympathizers of the Augustan reforms wished to see inculcated in Roman life. Fraenkel, in his monumental work on Horace, observes that several of the Odes in this cycle can be related, in manner and content, to Greek poets, notably Pindar.[4] In *Odes* 3. 2, where Horace deals with virtue, especially military prowess, his logical model would be a Greek poet who wrote in the same vein on war and the requirements of war. Such a poet was Tyrtaeus. According to Lycurgus, he was an Athenian who was invited by the Spartans to lead them against the Messenians.[5] Lycurgus goes on to relate that he did this with conspicuous success and that he left behind him elegiac poems to which the Spartan youths might listen and be taught courage. It would appear that Horace's aim was exactly the same, and in this case he could certainly choose no better model than Tyrtaeus. When we examine the three long fragments,[6] probably complete elegies, which survive of

1. References are to E. Diehl, *Anthologia lyrica Graeca* (Leipzig, 1925). For Simonides, see II.v, text and notes. See also L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*[2] (Cambridge, 1951), p. 113, n. 3.

2. See J. Gow, *Q. Horati Flacci carminum liber III* (Cambridge, 1896), pp. xl and 46.

3. E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), p. 260.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 269.

5. Lycurg. *Leocr.* 106.

6. Diehl, *op. cit.*, I.i, Frags. 6–9. Also J. M. Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1931) I, Frags. 10–12.